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This paper presents a stochastic simulation modelling tool used to study the 
implications of the mechanisms by which individual software developers’ efforts are 
allocated within large and complex open source software projects. It thus illuminates 
the role of different forms of “motivations-at-the-margin” in the micro-level resource 
allocation process of distributed and decentralized multi-agent engineering 
undertakings of this kind. We parameterize the model by isolating the parameter 
ranges in which it generates structures of code that share certain empirical 
regularities that are found to characterize actual projects. We find that, in this range, a 
variety of different motivations are necessarily represented within the community of 
developers.  There is a correspondence between the indicated mixture of motivations 
and the distribution of avowed motivations for engaging in FLOSS development, 
found in the survey responses of developers who were participants in large projects.  
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1. Introduction and Overview 
The research questions upon which this paper focuses concern the mechanisms that 
serve to direct and coordinate the work contributed by individual members of the distributed 
communities of developers associated with large, complex “free (in the sense of libre) and 
open source” software (FLOSS) projects.
1 This represents only one among the distinctive 
aspects of “the open source phenomenon,” many of which have attracted the attention of 
software engineers, social and management scientists and legal scholars.
2  But, the 
organization of the voluntary work of many individuals in order to collectively produce large 
and technically sophisticated artefacts is particularly intriguing when considered from the 
economic resource allocation standpoint: it appears to proceed without the guidance of either 
the “visible hand” of a hierarchical management structure, or the “invisible hand” of a 
decentralized market-like price system. 
Consequently, to understand the sources of both the capabilities and limitations of the 
mode of production exemplified by the array of visibly successful FLOSS projects such as 
Linux, Apache, Mozilla, Perl, MySQL, GNOME, and Open Office is not simply a matter of 
interest for those concerned with the relationship between this emerging segment of the 
software industry and the still dominant commercial producers of proprietary software 
packages. The “open source way of working” may turn out to have much broader application 
in the production of certain classes of information-goods. On that account, too, it deserves 
more systematic and sustained investigation than it has thus far received in the social and 
management science literature. 
The motivations of those volunteering their time to produce and release open source 
software, and the means by which large number of such contributions are coordinated to 
produce coherent and reliable software systems have been topics of lively interest, and some 
perplexity. Indeed, much of the research initially devoted to the FLOSS phenomena by 
economists, sociologists and other social scientists, as well software engineers and students of 
organizational and management science, focused on this pair of questions. Although usually 
treated separately, the two actually are closely related, and the nature of their interconnections 
will be seen to have significant implications affecting the mechanisms of resource allocation 
mechanisms with this paper is concerned. They also have direct consequences for the macro-
level properties of the resulting software systems, including the dynamics of code evolution, 
code maintainability and reliability – and possibly still other properties that affect the benefits 
afforded to end-users of the product, whether or not they have participated in its development. 
The nexus between the motivation of individuals and their coordination in collective 
activities   can be usefully studied within the framework provided by an agent-based 
simulation model, such as the one presented here. SimCode is a stochastic simulation tool that 
has been developed to illuminate and evaluate the social mechanisms by which individual 
software developers’ efforts come to be allocated among the variety of software engineering 
tasks involved in large and complex FLOSS projects. The latter involve software 
development conceived from the outset as a “community” (“C-mode”) production activity, 
and therefore differs importantly from the independent (“I-mode”) production of code by one 
                                                 
1 We refer to free, libre and open source software interchangeably: for simplicity, we use FLOSS and “open 
source” both being now common in academic contexts. But in all instances we have in mind, unless otherwise 
indicated, software that is distributed under licenses conforming to the OSI definition, of which the 
GNU/General Public License is the form most widely used.  
2 See, e.g.  Benkler (2002), Gonzalez-Barahona and Robles (2003), Koch and Schneider (2000), McGowan 
(2005), Scaachi (2003), von Hippel (2002,2004, 2005), Weber (2004).   - 2 -
or two individuals who release the program under open source licenses (see Dalle and David 
2003, 2005).  
Our model situates developers’ choices about what contributions they will make within 
a technical environment that is created and continues to evolve from the interactions among 
successive individual choice-actions of that kind. We suppose that when a developer 
considers contributing to a given project at a given moment in time, he or she faces a 
structured set of software modules (or “code packages”) whose respective technical properties 
and state of development (at that moment) are fully known. Individual selection decisions are 
assumed to be made in random order, each contributor contributing code to a particular “work 
package” of the project up to the limit set by their individual current code-writing capabilities 
(“effort endowments,” specified in equivalent physical source lines of code). Subject to that 
constraint, each developer’s selection is made where he or she perceives that effort is likely to 
yield the greatest “reward” -- directly or indirectly providing the greatest intrinsic or extrinsic 
source of satisfaction.  The framework posits that a major systematic determinant of micro-
level actions affecting and hence coordinating resource allocation within the project are the 
responses that are elicited, in effect, by the array of reward-promising signals that the agents 
receive at each point in time from state of the code itself. 
Quite obviously, this modelling approach abstracts from the coordinating functions that 
may be performed by the flow of direct communications among project participants and 
potential contributors. The email lists and other associated electronic fora through which 
those communications latter take place have begun to attract systematic study, but to date 
only limited progress has been made in relating the apparent network patterns in those 
interactions to the concurrent or subsequent code-writing activities of the participants, and 
tracing their temporal co-evolution through the life of the project.
3 Until it becomes possible 
to analyze the email threads and discern what immediate or intermediating roles those 
communications may play in directing, or guiding participating developers’ programming and 
patching contributions, we think it is reasonable to consider the impersonal coordinating 
signals that may be provided by the state of the code itself. 
Economists may be inclined to view this abstraction as resembling the conventional 
conceptualization of a decentralized resource allocation mechanism in which atomistic agents 
respond to disembodied price signals generated by competitive markets, rather than 
interacting socially with one another. That particular analogy should not be pressed too 
strongly, however, because in the model we present there is nothing that corresponds to 
market prices, just as in the actual system whose properties we are trying to simulate there are 
no prices. A different and more informative analogy may be drawn with the mechanisms 
found in certain zoological systems where coordination of the actors’ is achieved indirectly, 
in effect through signals imparted by the state of the artefacts that they collectively are 
fashioning. Such systems are referred to as “stygmergic,” and recently have begun to be more 
widely studied, and applied in computational systems as forms of “swarm intelligence”.
4  
The organization of the paper following this introductory overview is straightforward. 
Section 2 poses the questions about the open source mode of software production in their 
conceptual and analytical relationship to the preoccupation of much of the literature, which 
has been to try to identify one or another supposedly typical, or at least dominant motive that 
would explain the willingness to the mass of open source developers to volunteer their time 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., von Krogh, Spaeth and Lakhani (2003); Crowston and Howison (2003, 2005). Robles and Gonzalez-
Barahona (2005) present techniques that could be used integrate email list participation data with individuals’ 
contributions to the project’s code 
4 See e.g., Bonabeau, Dorigo, and Theraulaz (2000); Breukner and Paranuk (2002).]   - 3 -
skill in this pursuit Section 3 frames the present modelling approach empirically at the micro-
level, by considering what has been revealed by surveys regarding the variety of reasons that 
FLOSS developers offer when asked to rationalize both their involvement in the activity and 
choices of specific projects in which to participate. The problem is reformulated, by pointing 
to the roles of motivations-at-the-margin rather than to fundamental human motives for social 
actions such as ego-satisfaction or altruism, materialism or ideology.   
“Motivations-at-the-margin” refers to the discriminating goals and preference-
structures that affect individuals’ local choices of what, where and how much effort an 
individual agent will to contribute, and hence the distribution of focused “micro-motives” that 
critically affects the workings of within-project resource allocation mechanisms. This context 
makes it particular important to bring what can be learned from the surveys of FLOSS 
developers to bear specifically upon the question of the motives animating those involved 
with large projects. The discussion therefore summarizes the findings of several independent 
empirical studies of developer motivations that have used cluster analysis methods to 
delineate principal configurations of motives among the respondents to the. An analysis 
(David and Shapiro, 2007) of the cluster assignments of individual respondents to the 
FLOSS-US (2003) survey
5 reveals that the mix of motivational clusters present among 
contributors to large projects differs significantly in several respects from the mixture 
observed among the sub-sample of respondents engaged on very small (I-mode) projects; 
furthermore, none of the identified clusters was overwhelmingly preponderant among the 
sub-sample of respondents that were active contributors to large FLOSS projects. This 
evidence lends support to the idea that rather than conceptualizing the participants as 
homogenous in their motivations, “project development communities” may be formed by 
individuals with a variety of quite different “micro-motivations.” It thus poses the question of 
how the assortment of motivations among the developer community attracted by a project 
shape the collective performance of the ensemble, and perhaps the projects ultimate success 
or failure.  This question is tackled by means of simulation modelling in the remaining 
sections of the paper.  
Our approach in constructing a parsimonious dynamical agent-based model is described 
in Section 4, which gives a mathematical representation of a particular deterministic discrete 
choice formulation of such a structure. The model allows for parametric variations in the 
weights assigned along two dimensions regarding the responsiveness of agents to “rewards” 
of different kinds, which are specific to contributions made to different sub-projects within 
the evolving code. The differential responsiveness on the part of agents can be interpreted as 
corresponding to differences in their motivational profiles. One parameterized response 
dimension distinguishes rewards based solely upon peer-regard for the degree technical 
merits inherent in contributions (“commits”) to the project’s code; whereas at the opposite 
extreme, rewards in the form of instrumental utility provided to individual developers by their 
respective contributions.  The other dimension distinguishes been rewards that are 
individualistic, either in providing ego-gratification or utilitarian value for independent 
actions, contrasted with contributions whose nature requires more intense social interactions – 
and hence attraction to portions of the code (sub-projects) on which many others are engaged. 
 The four pure “pure types” of developer-motives that out schema can depict by 
extreme combinations of this pair of parameters (i.e., by values corresponding to the extrema 
of the two-dimensional surface which the parameter-pair defines) are given the following 
colorful labels: (a) “Raymondians”and “Lerner-Tiroleans”—who are kudos-seeking 
programmers, capable of and attracted to working on the technically more demanding sub-
                                                 
5 See http://www.stanford.edu/group/floss-us/index.html, and David, Waterman and Arora (2003).    - 4 -
projects for career reasons, not by community interactions; (b) “social hackers”, who are 
drawn by technically challenging tasks that will bring community recognition and esteem (c) 
“social learners”– novitiates to FLOSS, who generally are less skilled programmers seeking 
community interactions for self-improvement, and possibly self-actualization;  (d) “von 
Hippelites” – who are individualist “user-innovators’, not particularly drawn by intrinsic 
programming challenges in the projects infrastructure, but, instead, idiosyncratically attracted 
opportunities of building some particular functional capability that they will find more 
immediately useful.    
Section 5 then presents the results of experiments using a particular stochastic 
specification of this simulation structure, in order to establish the effects on a project’s 
development of alternative settings for that key parameter couplet. It is shown that they 
profoundly influence the probabilistic allocation of individual developers’ contributions, 
thereby affecting the morphology of the evolving code-tree. In particular, the joint 
specification of these two parameters -- which is to say, the relative strengths assigned to the 
four “pure motivational type” previously described – is found to control the model’s ability to 
simulate the emergence of certain interesting macro-level features that appear (from recent 
empirical studies) to characterize structural and dynamical properties of the evolution of large 
open source software projects. Strikingly, in order for the model to generate an increasingly 
skewed distribution of module sizes and linearity in the time-trend of the project’s overall file 
size,   the necessary domain of parameter settings describe combinations of all four of the 
“pure” motivation-types.  
The concluding section notices that the required intermediate domain in the parameter-
plane may be interpreted as corresponding to the mixture of the motivation clusters identified 
among survey respondents who had associated themselves with large projects. Hence the 
paper’s title: “It takes all kinds.” This is hardly advanced as a proof of necessity, let alone 
sufficiency for project growth, but rather as a first stage in the construction of a consistent 
vision of the generic features of “the open source way of working.” To underscore the 
qualifications that are warranted by the highly stylized nature of the simulation model in its 
present state of development, we close by review several directions in which future work – 
both ours and that of others -- will be required to make the SimCode framework a fully 
effective tool for integrating and assessing the implications of the growing body of empirical 
evidence about “micro-motives and macro-performance” of FLOSS development 
communities.    
 
2. What’s so interesting about open source production?  
  The initial contributions to the social science literature addressing the phenomenon of 
open source software have been directed primarily to identifying the motivations underlying 
the sustained and often intensive engagement of many highly skilled individuals in this non-
contractual and unremunerated mode of production.
6 That focus reflects a view that 
widespread voluntary participation in the creation and free distribution of economically 
valuable goods is something of an anomaly, at least from the viewpoint of mainstream 
microeconomic analysis. A second quest that has occupied observers, and especially 
economists, is to uncover the explanation for the evident success of open-source products in 
market competition against proprietary software – significantly on the basis not only of their 
                                                 
6 See, among the salient early contributions to the “economics of open source software,” Ghosh (1998), Harhoff, 
Henkel and von Hippel (2000), Lakhani and von Hippel (2000), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Weber (2000), Kogut 
and Metiu (2001).    - 5 -
lower cost, but their reputedly superior quality.
7 This problem resembles the first, in reflecting 
a state of surprise and puzzlement about the apparently greater efficiency that these voluntary, 
distributed production organizations have been able to attain vis-à-vis centrally-managed, 
profit-driven firms that are experienced in creating “closed” software products. 
  However, it is difficult to ground the intense research interest that open-source 
software production currently attracts on a supposition of that the phenomenon is truly new 
and strange. Cooperative production of information and knowledge, among members of 
distributed epistemic communities who do not expect direct remuneration for their efforts 
hardly qualifies as new departure: there are numerous historical precursors and precedents for 
open-source software, perhaps most notably in the “invisible colleges” that appeared among 
the practitioners of the new experimental and mathematically approaches to scientific inquiry 
in western Europe in the course of the 17th century.
8 Thus, “open science” -- the mode of 
inquiry that emerged and became formally institutionalized during the era of the Scientific 
Revolution under systems of public and private patronage – provides an obvious cultural and 
organizational point of reference for observers of contemporary communities of programmers 
engaged in developing free software and open source software.
9 The “communal” ethos and 
norms of “the Republic of Science” emphasize the cooperative character of the larger purpose 
in which individual researchers are engaged, stressing that the accumulation of reliable 
knowledge is an essentially social process. The force of its universalistic norm is to render 
entry into scientific work and discourse open to all persons of “competence,” while a second 
key aspect of “openness” is promoted by norms concerning the sharing of knowledge in 
regard to new findings and the methods whereby they were obtained. 
  Moreover, a substantial body of analysis by philosophers of science and 
epistemologists, as well as theoretical and empirical studies in the economics of knowledge, 
points to the superior efficiency of cooperative knowledge-sharing among peers as a mode of 
generating additions to the stock of scientifically reliable propositions.
10 In brief, the norm of 
openness is incentive compatible with a collegiate reputational reward system based upon 
                                                 
7 In this particular vein, see, for example Dalle and Jullien (2000, 2003), Bessen (2001), Kuan (2001), Benkler 
(2002). 
8 See, e.g., David (1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2004) and references to the history of science literature supplied therein. 
The professionalization of scientific research was a comparatively late development, as is well known; and as 
rapidly as that process proceeded since the late nineteenth century, the contributions of non-professionals in 
some domains of the exact sciences still have not been entirely eliminated. Optical astronomy provides a notable 
example in this regard: extensive communities of “amateur” star- and comet-watchers persist, and some among 
their members continue to score – and to verify – the occasional observational coup. 
9 This has not gone unrecognized by observers of the free and open software movements. In “The Magic 
Cauldron,” Raymond (1999/2001) explicitly notices the connection between the information-sharing behavior of 
academic researchers and the practices of participants in open-source projects. Further, Raymond’s (1999/2001) 
illuminating discussion (“in Homesteading the Noonesphere”) of the norms and reward systems (which motivate 
and guide developers’ selections of projects on which to work) quite clearly parallels the classic approach of 
Robert K. Merton (1973) and his followers in the sociology of science. This is underscored by Raymond’s 
rejoinder to N. Berzoukov’s (1999) allegations on the point. Kelty (2001), and David, Arora and Steinmueller 
(2001), expand the comparison with the norms and institutions of open/academic science. Nevertheless, one 
should observe that that the parallel is by no means exact: formal professional accreditation and institutional 
affiliation is a salient de facto requirement for active participation in modern academic and public sector research 
communities, yet the computer programming and other software development tasks – whether in the commercial 
or the free and open source spheres -- remains an activity that has resisted becoming “professionalized.”  
10 See Dasgupta and David (1994), David (1998b, 2002a, b) on the cognitive performance of open science 
networks in comparison with that of proprietary research organizations; David (2003) on the interaction between 
modern ‘open science’ and proprietary R&D.    - 6 -
accepted claims to priority; it also is conducive to individual strategy choices whose collective 
outcome reduces excess duplication of research efforts, and enlarges the domain of 
informational complementarities. This brings socially beneficial spillovers among research 
programs and abets rapid replication and swift validation of novel discoveries. The 
advantages of treating new findings as public goods in order to promote the faster growth of 
the stock of knowledge are thus contrasted with the requirement of restricting informational 
access in order to enlarge the flow of privately appropriable rents from knowledge stocks. The 
foregoing functional juxtaposition suggests a logical basis for the existence and perpetuation 
of institutional and cultural separations between two normatively differentiated communities 
of research practice.  
  Open-source software production activities warrants systematic investigation, in our 
view, not just as a sub-species of the unusual class of technological objects called “computer 
software,” but because the conjunction of a particular set of trends in the modern economy 
may give this development significant implications for the future of the advance of 
knowledge, and consequently for knowledge-driven economic growth.
11 The first of those 
trends is that information-goods that share many of the special properties of software have 
been moving more and more to center-stage among the drivers of sustainable economic 
development. Secondly, the enabling of peer-to-peer organizations for information 
distribution and utilization is an increasingly obtrusive consequence of the direction in which 
digital technologies are advancing.
 Thirdly, the advantages of an “open” (and cooperative) 
mode of organizing the generation of new knowledge – although long been recognized to 
have efficiency properties – has come to be increasingly appreciated, in contrast to the 
institutional solutions to the public goods problem that entail the restriction of access to 
information and research tools through secrecy or property rights enforcement. In contrast 
with the situation that prevails in most of the experimental and observational fields of 
research, where the conduct of open science encounters increasingly critical problems of 
providing public funding for professional researchers engaged in an increasingly costly 
pursuit, the mobilization of volunteered expertise from programmers who are able to 
communicate and collaborate essentially freely over an existing (Internet) infrastructure, 
makes the advantages of this way of organizing R&D activities all the more obtrusive.  
  Fourthly, and of great practical significance for those who seek to study it 
systematically, the open-source software mode of production itself is generating a wealth of 
quantitative information about this instantiation of “open epistemic communities.” This latter 
development makes open-source software activities a valuable window through which to 
study the more generic and fundamental processes that are responsible for its power, as well 
as the factors that are likely to limit its domain of viability in competition with other modes of 
organizing economic activities. 
  This re-framing of the phenomenon points toward a conceptual approach to the study 
of open source software production that highlights a broader, ultimately more policy-oriented 
set of issues than those which hitherto have dominated the literature. It is directed to 
answering an interrelated pair of canonical questions. First, we wish to know by what 
                                                 
11 The phenomenon of free and open source software is perceived by Benkler (2002: pp. 1-2) as an exemplifying 
“a much broader social-economic phenomenon the broad and deep emergence of a new, third mode of 
production in the digitally networked environment.” This mode he labels “’commons-based peer production’, to 
distinguish it from the property- and contract-based modes of firms and markets. Its central characteristic is that 
groups of individuals successfully collaborate on large scale projects following a diverse cluster of motivational 
drives and social signals rather than either market prices or managerial commands.” Anyone at all familiar with 
the history of open science since the 17
th century will be disconcerted – to say the least --by this particular 
imputation of novelty and significance to open-source projects.    - 7 -
mechanisms open-source software projects mobilize the human resources, allocate the 
participants diverse expertise, coordinate the contributions and retain the commitment of their 
members? Second, how fully do the products of these essentially self-directed efforts meet the 
long-term needs of software users in the larger society, and not simply provide satisfactions of 
various kinds for the developers? Although these questions will be recognized immediately by 
management scientists and economists to be utterly familiar and straightforward, they have 
not yet having been explicitly posed or systematically pursued in the present context. 
  To pursue answers to these concrete questions compels a detailed examination of the 
actual workings of the system of social organization that actually allocates software 
development resources among the various software systems and applications projects that are 
being undertaken by “communities” of distributed and sometimes anonymous volunteers – as 
it is the situation of the large projects are found in the world of open-source software. How 
does the ensemble of developers collectively “select” among the observed array of projects 
that are launched?  In contrast to efforts to illuminate the nature of the activities carried on by 
open source software development communities by reference to analogies with “bazaars,” and 
“gift exchange societies,” the tasks set by the foregoing approach represent an explicit 
response to the challenge of providing non-metaphorical answers to the classic questions of 
whether and how this instance of a decentralized decision resource allocation process could 
achieve coherent outcomes. What makes this an especially interesting problem, of course, is 
the possibility of assessing the extent to which institutions of the kind that have emerged in 
the free and open source movements are enabling them to accomplish that outcome – without 
help either from the “invisible hand” of the market mechanism driven by price signals, or the 
“visible hands” of centralized managerial hierarchies.
12  
 
3. Characterizing open-source communities at work 
SimCode can be described formally as a deterministic discrete choice framework, in 
which a sub-set of the parameters are interpreted as representing the force that the 
motivations of individual developers exert on the placement of their contributions among the 
“work-sites” within the project. The distribution of these underlying and probably 
heterogeneous motivations, and perceptions about the structure of differential rewards 
associated with various kinds of contributions, affects the way that the project’s participants 
respond to the current state of the code. The pure forms of the motivations caricatured by 
those interpretations correspond to (1) the desire for the psychic or material reward derived 
from a “hacker” reputation based upon expert peer regard, and the ego-gratification of 
charismatic community leadership, or else “kudos”-seeking motivations (2) satisfactions to be 
derived from opportunities to that improve one’s programming skills, and more generally 
social interaction-seeking motivations, or (3) enjoyment of the benefits of personally using 
the resulting software product, or else user-innovation motivations. Such reasons are salient 
among those given by survey respondents for their continued participation in open source 
projects, or are reported by expert participant observers of open source communities. Thus, 
the approach adopted here is to consider not whether such motives account for the amount of 
effort that is contributed voluntarily to the project, but, instead how such motives would bear 
upon the choices that developers make regarding the allocation of their incremental efforts, 
that is to say, to which among the existing modules (sub-projects) or new module the amount 
                                                 
12 Benkler (2002) has formulated this problem as one that appears in the organizational space between the 
hierarchically managed firm and the decentralized competitive market, focuses attention primarily on the 
efficiency of software project organizations, rather than considering the regime as a whole.    - 8 -
of code they can produce will be contributed: what we suggest to call “motivations at the 
margin”. 
Indeed, SimCode builds on the generic features of non-market social interaction 
mechanisms, which involve feedbacks from the cumulative results of individual actions, and 
thereby are capable of achieving substantial coordination and coherence in the collective 
performance of the ensemble of distributed agents. It has been structured with a view to its 
suitability for subsequent refinement and use in integrating and assessing the significance of 
empirical findings about patterns of resource allocation within large and more complex open-
source projects, well known exemplars of which are the Linux operating system, the Mozilla 
web-browser and the Apache web-server. Systematic empirical evidence about the 
participants in such projects, their behaviors, patterns of communication and the internal 
modes of project organization has only lately begun to be collected.
13 Nonetheless, to guide 
the initial specifications it is possible to draw upon insights provided by experienced project 
leaders and descriptive generalizations about micro-level incentives from survey- and 
interview-based studies, regarding the nature of the community norms that might not only 




The first of the salient sets of “motivations at the margin” are the gamut of individual 
instrumental reasons that provide impetus to what may be described as “independent user-
implemented innovations.”
14 Indeed, this probably applies to the great mass of identifiably 
discrete open source software projects, because a major consideration driving many 
individuals who engage in the production of open source would appear to be the direct utility 
or satisfaction they expect to derive by using their creative outputs. The power of this 
motivating force obviously derives from the property of immediate efficacy, which has been 
noticed as a distinctive feature of computer programs. But, no less obviously, this class of 
motives will be most potent where the utilitarian objective does not require developing a large 
                                                 
13 Pioneering studies of large projects include the work of S. Koch and G. Schneider (2000); Tuomi (2000, 
2001); Dempsey et al. (1999, 2002); S. Krishnamurthy (2002). More recent studies have sought to exploit new 
methods of automated data-mining from source code repositories, and to build links between that information 
and data on communications flows among project participants. On patterns of authorship and the structure of 
code within large projects, obtained using the CODD data extraction algorithm (developed by R. A. Ghosh and 
V. V. Prakash (and described first to measuring the code size of projects in the Orbiten Free Survey (2000) [see 
http:www.orbiten.org/codd, see Ghosh (2003)]; for findings from the application of CODD to studies of 
sequential releases of the Linux kernel see Ghosh and David (2003). See Gonzalez-Barahona and Robles (2003, 
2004); Robles, Koch and Gonzalez-Barahona (2004); Gonzalez-Baharona, Lopez and Robles (2004).  
14 The term evidently derives from von Hippel’s (2001, 2002) emphasis on the respects in which open source 
software exemplifies the larger phenomenon of “user-innovations. That “scratching a personal itch” is an 
important motivation among developers seems clear enough: of the 1562 respondents to the FLOSS-US Survey 
(see David, Waterman and Arora 2003), 56 percent scored as a “very important” or “important” the following 
reason for their participation: “I needed to perform tasks that could only be done with modified versions of 
existing software”; 53 percent assigned the same degrees of importance to: “I needed to fix bugs in software that 
I was using.” But, whether individual user innovation typically gives rise to large community-based FLOSS 
development projects is another matter. The great mass of open source projects that appear on sites such as 
SourceForge and FreshMeat are small, and typically involve only a few identified developers at most. Indeed, 
considering the over 60 thousand project-groups listed on SourceForge in 2003, it turns out that 72 percent of 
them had only a single participant-member (private communication from Francesco Rullani, 13 December 
2004). Whether the bulk of these small projects fit von Hippel’s category of “user-innovators” cannot be 
determined from their size alone. Some might arise from code intended for commercial purposes that 
subsequently was released under open source license by the author.    - 9 -
and complex body of code, and so can be achieved quite readily by the exertion of the 
individual programmer’s independent efforts, or those of a small number of collaborators. In 
our view, it is unlikely that a person writing an obscure driver for a either an obsolete or a 
newly-marketed printer that he wishes to use will be much concerned about the value that 
would be attached to this achievement by “the open-source software community.” Individuals 
engaging in this sort of software development may regard themselves as belonging in every 
way to the free software and open source movements, and may be committed to using open 
source development tools. 
 A useful distinction here is made between FLOSS development in “community-mode”, 
or, for convenience C-mode, contrasting it with software production in purely “independent” 
I-mode. Inasmuch as I-mode products and producers, almost by definition, tend to remain 
restricted in their individual scope and do not provide as direct an experience of social 
participation, the empirical bases for generalizations about their code development procedures 
is too thin to provide interesting behavioral propositions that could be incorporated in a 
formal model distinct from that being developed here for the large, multi-agent collaborative 
projects.
15 Nonetheless, in the context of modelling resource allocation in C-mode, it is both 
appropriate and possible to make allowance for the possible role played by individual 
idiosyncratic use-motivations in affecting the randomly drawn developers’ selections of the 
particular part of the large software project to which he or she is to contribute. As will be 
seen, this can be done quite readily, and without having to delineate the specific use-functions 
provided by the applications modules of the projects: we simply can add a stochastic 
component to the “peer regard” and the “learning community externalities” considerations 
that we model explicitly as affecting task selection behavior. 
 
(2) Kudos-seeking and “Peer Regard” 
Economists have suggested that career considerations, involving expectations of future 
material benefits from “signalling” expertise through open source contributions, are powerful 
in motivating the voluntary participation of developers (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). This 
plausible interpretative hypothesis rests largely on theoretical speculation, on analogies with 
the sociological studies of academic “open science” communities, and on preliminary 
empirical studies of open-source communities at work. Useful guidance in this respect can be 
drawn from another, less purely individualist framework for understanding recurring 
voluntary transactions: “The economy of regard” has been conceptualized by Avner Offer 
(1997) as a system of reciprocated exchanges that is situated “between the gift and the 
market.” This is helpful in the present context for two principal reasons. It moves the 
discussion away from the essentially atomistic mode of analysis familiar in cartel theory and 
public finance economics, where agents are depicted as passively deciding whether to free-
ride or join a pre-existing collective organization whose existence they view to be 
independent of their personal actions. Instead, it invites analysis of the intrinsic satisfactions 
that people may derive from interactive, community-creating aspects of participation – 
particularly in large open-source projects. Furthermore, the notion of the ‘economy of regard’ 
                                                 
15 The present aspect of our investigations abstracts from the possible effects upon the organization of open-
source production that may arise from choices among the licensing options. Such analytical attention as the 
question of open source software licensing has received from economists typically ignores the possibility of that 
consideration of such (production) effects might shape the licensing decision. See, e.g., Lerner and Tirole (2002), 
Gaudeul (2003). In a recent and interesting departure from the “mainstream” tradition, however, Gambardella 
and Hall (2004) examine a simple model that allows for the connection between the choice of licensing 
arrangements and the optimality of the production regime for information goods.    - 10 -
being distinct from the classical “gift economy,” and positioned the intermediate space of 
non-market social systems based upon indirectly reciprocated, and partially personalized 
exchanges, may serve to characterize the larger open-source projects as belonging to a 
broader array of epistemic communities as institutionalized communities of practice.
16  
This framework accommodates the suggestion by Eric Raymond (1999) that the choices 
made by developers – particularly, choices regarding where and how to contribute their 
expertise and efforts – are guided by perceptions of the likely consequences in terms of 
recognition and esteem (including self-esteem) that those selections will elicit from those 
working on the projects in question, and from peers in the open source community at large. 
Raymond’s argument, however, is considerably more restricted than the proposition that the 
voluntary participation of people in developing open source software is motivated by the 
promise of “reputation effects.” Because it focuses on non-pecuniary, psychic satisfactions 
from the approbation of one’s peers, it is not incompatible from the proposal to explain the 
phenomenon of voluntary participation in the collective production of software systems by 
suggesting that the people involved were “all” seeking material rewards that could be 
expected to flow from outside the open source community to those who had created a 
reputation within it, based upon their demonstrated expertise. However, focusing on regard is 
significantly more helpful in the context of a quest to understand in some detail how 
coordination and coherence is achieved in these distributed and largely unmanaged software 
projects. Basically, it suggests that there is a core of expert “hackers” who allocate their 
efforts in a quest for kudos that they believe will be forthcoming from their peers on the basis 
of the specific nature of the technical contributions that they make to the collective code-
building enterprise. For this to serve as a mechanism of coordination and resource allocation, 
it would be important that the participants in the open source software community shared the 
normative valuation criteria for judging each other’s technical contributions; that, being 
embedded in the same “economy of regard,” they understood and accepted its specific norms, 
as well as being motivated by the same quest for kudos.  
 
(3) Social interaction-seeking 
  It would be a mistake, however, to completely separate the issue of the sources of 
regard-oriented motivation with the question of how individuals’ awareness of community 
sentiment, and their receptivity to signals transmitted in social interactions, serves to guide 
and even constrain their private and public actions; indeed, even to modify their manifest 
goals. One must indeed go farther than this, however, by recognizing the potential importance 
of at least two other important classes of reasons why developers continue to participate in 
open source software projects. In their preliminary analysis of data from the FLOSS-US 2003 
Survey, David, Waterman and Arora (2004) note the existence of a marked contrast between 
the tenor of responses to “general motivation” questions about developers’ reasons for 
engaging in open source development work—questions of the same character as those posed 
by the FLOSS 2002 Survey (Ghosh et al. 2003), and a follow-on set of questions that asked 
why the respondent had chosen to work on their first project. The latter responses are 
significantly focused on instrumental considerations, most notably, the individual’s interest in 
the technical characteristics of the project either for “skill development” or for personal use.  
                                                 
16 One qualification might be noted, however: “regard” in Offer’s discussion carries strongly personal and 
subjective connotations, whereas the term “esteem” is conveys greater objectivity and detachment, being used to 
signify appreciation for the accomplishments or professional qualities of another, rather than their person. See 
Brennan and Pettit (2004) on “the economy of esteem” in civil society and politics.    - 11 -
  Further analysis of FLOSS-2002 Survey responses by Rudiger Glott (2004) found that 
among the majority of the respondents who gave initial reasons for participating in open-
source software activities that were so diffuse as to resist categorization, the reasons they 
offered for continuing to participation display a bi-polar movement towards either more 
sharply delineated “ideological” commitment to the community, or a dominantly 
“instrumental” rationale. In the latter category, significantly, ‘improving software skills” – 
already present among the focused motives for beginning participation -- emerged saliently 
among the reasons for sustained participation. Thus, we should recognize that neophyte 
developers may be strongly drawn toward working on sub-projects where the opportunities 
for learning from others, and beginning to contribute “patches” or simpler applications 
modules are most accessible, rather than absorbing and being guided by the peer regard 
criteria reflecting the open source “hacker ethos” described by Eric Raymond. This, one might 
conjecture, would induce them to gravitate toward sites in the evolving code where there is 
more activity, and a larger number of learner-peers among whom discussion of programming 
approaches and craft, as well as more abundant opportunities to observe ongoing code 
improvement. In a sense such clusters of activity provide the attractions of “learning 
community externalities.”  
Learning externalities would be likely to attract developers who are concerned primarily 
to improve programming skills and therefore will be motivated to contribute to those modules 
where there have been many previous contributions, a larger body of code to examine, and 
(most likely) a bigger sub-community of developers who are familiar with, and able to impart 
instructive information about technical aspects of the creation of the code present in that 
module. The argument for this interpretation carries even greater force in the case of neophyte 
developers, because access to a socially interactive and supportive learning environment are 
likely to be especially important at that stage, perhaps more than the particular technical 
features of the sub-project. Eventually, acquisition of software skills and corresponding 
improvements also should have a positive impact on future opportunities for gainful 
employment in the industry. 
The foregoing discussion has drawn upon a variety (one might say a melange) of 
survey-based evidence and anecdotal observations about avowed and inferred motives of 
individual engaged in FLOSS development. While it may be adequate to portray the relevant 
range of activities that are in one way or another rewarding, it is uncomfortable not to have a 
more concrete view of the relevant frequency and intensity with which the various 
motivations (reasons for behavior) are expressed by those who actually are working on the 
larger FLOSS projects whose modes of internal coordination we seek to understand. Such a 
view is not offered by the entire distribution of responses to motivation-related questions in 
the large surveys discussed here, for the simple reason that the respondents include a very 
large proportion of individuals who appear to be engaged on very small projects, involving 
only one or two contributors.
17   
                                                 
17 In the case of  the FLOSS-US (2003) Survey, this may be inferred from the fact that of 1473 respondents who 
list a current project, 64.8 percent describe it as “unknown” or “slightly known” and 33.0 percent said they 
launched the project alone, while 46.8 percent reported that they launched it with others.  Similarly, to 1055 
respondents reporting the proportion of code they had contributed to their current project, 31 percent put that 
figure at or above 95 percent. (See David 2006 for further discussion.)  Further confirmation is provided by the 
great mass of very small projects that appear on open source platforms such as SourceForge and FreshMeat:  
considering the over 60 thousand project-groups listed on SourceForge in 2003, it turns out that 72 percent of 
them had only a single participant-member (private communication from Francesco Rullani, 13 December 
2004). Whether the bulk of these small projects are truly solo development efforts is not certain, as some may 
have originated in code previously written for commercial purposes and by subsequently released under open 
source license by the copyright holders.    - 12 -
Table 1, however, presents the finding of a study that unambiguously identified 180 
individuals among the respondents to the FLOSS-US Survey as currently working on a 
project that had 30 or more members, and compared their motivational profiles with the 422 
FLOSS-US Survey respondents whose current projects were found to be very small, having 
only 1 or 2 members.
18  All the FLOSS-US respondents’ answers to the battery of questions 
about their reasons for participating in FLOSS activities were subjected to (agglomerative 
hierarchical) cluster analysis, producing the five distinctive clusters that are indicated in Table 
1. The summary descriptive characterizations of clusters 1-5 shown in this table are based on 
an analysis of the distribution of responses from the entire survey sample to a question that 
asked them to indicate how important each of eleven reasons for FLOSS participation was in 
their own experience.
19  Reasons that were accorded especially marked importance or 
unimportance (among the full sample of respondents assigned to each of the clusters) are 
indicated as the distinctive motives characteristics of the respective clusters.  
 
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
 
What the Table presents are the distributions among the motivation-profile clusters of 
the sub-group of respondents that are known to have been working on the large projects. For 
purposes of comparison, the corresponding distribution is shown for the sub-group of 
respondents that were involved in the very small projects. Three points about these results 
deserve particular notice. 
 The first and most evident point that emerges about the motivational characteristics of 
participants in large FLOSS projects is simply their diversity: rather a single motivational 
profile, what one finds is a mixture of distinctive profiles, and a mixture that can also be 
distinguished from that found in the population of developers who involve themselves in 
much smaller projects. 
Secondly, looking at the distribution for the “community mode” developers, it is seen 
that those in clusters 2, 4 and 5 – each of which are marked by the technical interests and 
indications of expertise among their membership – are about equal in numerical weight.
20 
                                                 
18  David and Shapiro (2007) make use of information about current project names to identify the projects and 
link them to other sources, such the contemporaneous archives of SourceForge, from which the number of 
project members can be determined.  A total of 336 project attachments to 14 different projects in the >29 
membership size class were found (for 180 individual FLOSS-US survey respondents). The Linux kernel, 
Debian, Mozilla and OpenOffice.org were the 4 projects that drew the highest frequency of participation among 
this sample of developers, and collectively they accounted for 40.1% of all the attachments.   
19 The analysis constructed relative intensity measures of “importance” and “unimportance” on the basis of the 
distribution of answers to each of the 11 suggested motives, forming the ratio between the numbers within each 
cluster that answered “very important” and “important” and the number that answered “unimportant.”  The ratios  
for the several cluster was normalized for each suggested motive – dividing it by the corresponding ratio in the 
whole population.  See David and Shapiro (2007) for further details. Some ancillary information about expressed 
motivations also was examined in arriving as these characterizations – particularly, (a)the cluster distribution of 
individuals who (under the option “Other”) wrote in various extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for their 
participation in FLOSS development; (b) the relative intensity scores of cluster members’ reasons for choosing 
their current FLOSS projects.  
20 Cluster 1 is a small and rather anomalous group that we have labelled “professionals”. Apparently already 
expert (not being interested in improving software skills, or learning about new programs) they representing a bit 
over 5 percent of the total sub-ground on the large projects, and reject the importance of any of the intrinsic 
rewards and  ideological reasons for collaborating in these projects.  They assert, like many others, that it is 
important to them to be able to modify software code.    - 13 -
Their combined weight exceeds that of the “social learners” in cluster 3, but not by very much 
(89 vs 81).  This is consistent with other less systematic reports that the large projects do 
indeed attract a significant proportion of comparatively less adept programmers, who are 
unlikely to be allowed much free rein to commit code in the more critical modules of the 
project infrastructure; they gain such experience as they may acquire among the mass of 
contributors seeking to commit code for driver subsystems and other similarly non-critical 
modules.
21  
  A third point to note is that the large and small project participants do differ 
significantly in their distributions among the motivational profile clusters.
22   As a group, 
those in clusters 1 and 2  comprise almost a quarter (22.3 %) of the identified members of the 
large, C-mode projects, whereas their counterparts represent only 12.8 % of the participants in 
the in the I-mode projects; virtually all of the differential weight is contributed by the greater 
preponderance of the (cluster 2) “hackers.” By comparison, it is striking that that the 
importance attached to social interactions with like-minded individuals, and the software 
skills-improving motivations that are prominently cited by developers assigned to cluster 3 do 
not distinguish the participants in small projects from those in large projects; members of this 
cluster carry just about the same relative weights among the C-mode and I-mode project 
populations. Obviously, neither a sense of participation in and self-identification with the 
open source movement, nor the opportunity to observe and learn from the source code of 
others’ projects, requires being “embedded” in community-based FLOSS development. 
   On the other hand, it is rather striking that if one considers the developers 
characterized as “workaday programmers” (cluster 4) and “user-innovators” (cluster 5) 
together, their combined frequency relative to that of the other 3 cluster-members is rather 
lower (0.49) for the C-mode projects than it is for I-mode projects (0.62). Developers in the 
cluster characterized as “user-innovators” are the second largest group in both the very 
smallest and the largest classes of projects, there relative importance being somewhat greater 
in the latter, I-mode projects.  These individuals, who as a group are not so intensely 
motivated to learn about and patch code written by others, and who tend to report having 
launched the projects on which they are working, are seen (not surprisingly) to figure 
relatively prominently among the developer population who are occupied with 1- and 2-
person projects.
23  
  The foregoing are not the only respects in some systematic differences are observed 
between the sub-populations of developers that participate in C-mode and I-mode projects.
24  
Although details are not immediately germane to our present concerns, the very existence of 
significant differences between  I-mode and C-mode contributors to FLOSS production in the 
                                                 
21 On the control of commits exercised by maintainers in large projects that provide learning opportunities for the 
less expert programmers, see Kroah-Hartman’s (2005) informative description of this important aspect of   
governance  in the Linux kernel development process.   
22 David and Shapiro (2007) report a value of 18.92 for Pearson’s of Chi-square (df=4), which rejects the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference between the I-mode and the C-mode distributions in Table 1, at the .001 
level.    
23 In proportion to the total numbers in I-mode and C-mode projects, the cluster 5 developers’s share in the 
former class of projects is 20 percent higher (i.e., 0.242/.200 = 1.20).  
24 Other (non-motivational) differences between participants in large and very small FLOSS projects are reported 
by David and Shapiro (2007), including (i) significantly higher mean age, and higher proportions (ii) having 
worked on >5 projects, (iii) remaining on one of their current projects for more than 5 years, (iv) remaining 
attached to their first project while joining another project, (v) engaged in FLOSS activities before their work 
day, (vi) during employed hours, (vii)  in off-work intervals while at place of employment, etc.     - 14 -
distribution of demographic, employment and experience characteristics should be reassuring, 
as it supports interpreting the differing mix of motivational profile-clusters as reflections of  
variations in the relative frequencies within those populations of individuals with distinctive 
attitudes and traits that are pertinent to their capabilities as software developers.    
     
4. SimCode – A Simulation Framework 
  The empirical insights gleaned in the preceding section furnish support for the idea 
that rather than conceptualizing the participants as homogenous in their motivations, “project 
development communities” may be formed by individuals with a variety of quite different 
“micro-motivations.” This is an important point of departure for our modelling exercise, 
because the actions of individual developers associated with a large project lie at the core of 
the stochastic simulation structure that is employed to represent the way in which those 
actions are coordinated.
25  Our framework situates developers’ choices as to what 
contributions they will make within a technical context that is formed and evolves from the 
interactions among successive choices of that kind. Thus, when a developer considers 
contributing to a given project at a given moment in time, we suppose that he or she faces a 
structured set of software modules
26 whose respective technical properties and state of 
development (at that moment) are fully known.
27 
  Individual selection decisions of this kind are assumed to be made in random order, 
each contributor contributing code to a particular “work package” of the project up to the limit 
set by their current code-writing capabilities (their respective individual “effort endowments,” 
which we take to be measured in equivalent physical source lines of code). Subject to that 
constraint, each developer’s selection is made where he or she perceives that effort is likely to 
yield the greatest “reward” (directly or indirectly providing the most personal satisfaction or 
sense of accomplishment). 
   Our model thus posits that a major systematic determinant of micro-level resource 
allocation decisions – in the form of within-project task selection by developers – are the 
responses that are in effect elicited by signals that they receive at each point in time from state 
of the code itself. Quite obviously, this approach abstracts from the coordinating functions 
that may be performed by the flow of direct communications among project participants (and 
potential contributors) that take place via email lists and other associated electronic fora.
28 
While economists may view our abstraction as resembling the conventional conceptualization 
of a decentralized resource allocation mechanism in which atomistic agents respond to 
disembodied price signals generated by competitive markets, rather than interacting socially 
with one another, the analogy should not be pressed too strongly. There is nothing in the 
                                                 
25 The present version of this model has benefited from previous work on tree models (Carayol & Dalle, 2000) 
and from various criticisms and suggestions that were elicited from academic researchers and participant 
observers in open-source projects by our “early release” strategy of publication (Dalle & David, 2003). The goal, 
of course, remains not the achievement of “realism” but, rather the parsimonious representation of critical 
resource allocation mechanisms that, in this case, are confined to operating within a given large project.  
26 We use the term “module” or (code-)“package” interchangeably.  
27 This implies that each new contribution becomes immediately accessible to all developers, a simplification 
made in this version of the model. In reality there are variable lags between submissions and “commits” of code, 
and some submitssions of new code or of “patches” will not be accepted by the relevant project maintainer(s). 
28 To say that we have abstracted from such communications is not to say that we hold them not to be worth 
studying, or are prepared to rate these social interactions as unimportant. Quite the contrary for recent research 
integrating the study of email repositories and code repositories has yielded interesting and informative findings. 
See, e.g, Gonzalez-Barahona and Robles (2004).    - 15 -
present model that corresponds to market prices, just as in the actual system whose properties 
we are trying to simulate there are no prices, and another informative analogy may be drawn 
with the mechanism found in certain zoological systems that are referred to as “stygmergic.”
29  
 
3.1 Structure of the model 
  We give specific form to the argument advanced in previous sections about different 
motivations, for which we consider here the following further suppositions: 
 (1) Modules vary in their attractiveness to all developers in the population according to a 
commonly perceived reputational reward structure based on positive “peer regard.” This 
follows the contention that there is such a shared normative structure related to the 
technical importance of distinct development tasks, which influences the individual 
developers’ decisions about where in the project they will contribute. 
(2) Developers have heterogeneous user preferences among all the existing modules (and 
potential modules that have yet to be created) for each module, which are stem from the 
anticipated “own-use” value of some particular application feature, or “affordance” of the 
project. 
Combining (1) and (2) for developer i and module m, we have: 
    
ii
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where 
i
m R  is the reward of contributing to module m for developer i, m ρ  is the regard-based 
reward and 
i
m e  is the user-based reward. 
We may assume, further, that the 
i
m e  in the population follow the traditional assumptions of 
discrete choice theory (Anderson, de Palma & Thisse, 1992), and notably that this random 
variable is i.i.d.: hence, the probability of a given developer choosing module m can be 





all modules all virtual modules
mm
mm
chosen module module m m
ρα
ρ αρ α ′
′ ==
′ ⎡⎤ == ⎣⎦
+ ∑∑
P , (0.1) 
where the variable α is a measure of the incremental contribution, and we allow for the choice 
of initiating a new module by introducing the notion of “virtual modules”, described more 
completely below. Hence, the more attractive modules will be selected, but only 
                                                 
29 The term “stygmergy” was coined by the zoologist P.P. Grassé, as having been compounded from “styg” (for 
sign) and ergonomic (for work) in describing the complex interactions between the individual termites belonging 
to a colony that was constructing a mud nest, and the morphology of the materials in their constructed 
environment. More recently, the concept of stygmergy has come to be applied in the computer modelling of 
morphogenic processes in which the actors of a multi-agent system communicate indirectly through their 
environment (which is shaped by their collective actions), rather than via direct feedback among themselves: see 
Bonabeau et al. (1999); Therolaz and Bonabeau (1995). Derix, Simon and Coates (2003) survey of contemporary 
computer simulation models of this kind in the field of architecture. Robles, Merelo, and Gonzalez-Barahona, 
(2005) present a FLOSS development simulation model on “stygmergic” principles, but one that is considerably 
closer to the ant- and wasp-behaviors, in that no connections are drawn with human motivation, differential 
responses to technical differences in code-writing projects, or project governance mechanisms of even the 
simplest sort.     - 16 -
probabilistically because of the influence of heterogeneous intrinsic user-preferences among 
the existing (and virtual) modules.
30 
Open-source developers do not simply consider adding their efforts to existing 
modules, but may instead create new ones. To account for this important aspect of code 
growth, we invoke the following modelling finesse: suppose that to every existing module 
there is associated a ‘virtual’ module, which stands for the eventuality that a new module 
could be created from the existing one, either by developing an existing functionality out of it 
(in the form of an external module), or simply by adding a new one that would supplement the 
given module. Clearly then, the new module and the existing one would be technically linked. 
Figure 1 represents the growth of a software system according to this rule: at each step, red 
lines and circles represented the last created module, while blues lines and circles represent 
virtual modules attached to each existing one, and black lines and circles represent older 
modules created during earlier steps.  
 
    (Insert  Figure  1  About  Here) 
 
  In this framework, the emerging architecture of the modules is mathematically a tree, 
since, by construction, there are no loops and each module is linked to only one (parent) 
module. This tree does not correspond exactly to either an actual directory tree, or to the full 
set of technical and functional dependencies known as the architecture of a software system 
(Bass, Clements & Kazman, 1998), since some of technical dependencies are obviously not 
accounted for. We would rather characterize it as an emerging architecture, which “stems” 
from the fact that developers generally decide to create a new module to solve a technical 
problem they face while working on a particular existing one, or as a development or part of 
an existing module. This emerging architecture here has much to do with what Herbert A. 
Simon famously characterized years ago in a seminal article on the “architecture of 
complexity” (1962), and this formulation is very much indebted to that conceptualization – all 
the more so as the emerging architecture that Simon considered is precisely a tree-like 
“hierarchical system.”
31 Indeed, Simon suggested that the emerging architecture of complex 
systems tended to often be spontaneously tree-like, because complex systems were born out of 
simple ones, and because simple systems then tend to be somehow included in more complex 
ones. In our model of open-source software development, the rationale for the emergence of a 
hierarchy of modules is largely similar: a complex system is dynamically born out of a simple 
one; new modules are created out of existing ones to supplement them by developing existing 
                                                 
30 Further studies are needed, notably to introduce notably interdependent user preferences and more specific 
accounting of the attraction of applicative layers for users, turning the present structure into a full agent-based 
simulation framework.  
31 This should not be interpreted in the usual sense of hierarchy, which simply could describe an architecture 
comprising of several levels. Indeed, to avoid such mis-understandings, the French translation of Simon’s paper 
has typically selected a word meaning “tree-like” (arborescent) to translate “hierarchy.” A further connection 
between the tree-like architecture and Simon’s work on semi-decomposable systems will be noted below in 
connection with the proposition that if multiple connections among the nodes at every level, and a fortiori from 
any level throughout the entire tree, additions of a module could impose costs that would inhibit that form of 
code expansion.    - 17 -
functionalities or adding new ones; and these new modules can be included in higher ones 
during the compilation process or at least are called as sub-systems.
32  
 
  3.2. Specification of the “peer regard” norms 
  Interpreting Raymond’s (1999) and other observers’ characterization of the normative 
structure of peer appraisal based on the technical nature of the contributions made by open 
source software developers, we posit that (statistically speaking) developers tend to prefer 
lower-level modules to higher-level ones in the hierarchical structure presented above, since 
the former, more general ones, are regarded as more generally relevant by their peers than 
more specialized ones, and also because their visibility being higher, it will automatically 
grant their contributors more regard from their peers. Contributing to the Linux kernel is 
deemed a potentially more rewarding activity than contributing to the file system, and the 
latter still dominates writing an obscure driver for a newly-marketed printer. Stated 
differently, we postulate here that there is a strong dependency between the emerging 
hierarchical architecture of the software system and the associated hierarchy of peer regard. 
Yet in other words, we postulate that there is a lexicographic ordering of rewards based upon 
a discrete, mainly technically-based “tree-like” structure formed by the successive addition of 
modules. Clearly, this is an important assumption that should be tested empirically: in this 
respect, David, Dalle, Ghosh & Wolak (2004/2006) present preliminary elements in this 
direction, by showing that the pattern of signed and un-signed contributions in the Linux 
kernel is not random, and tends to show that technical dependencies tend to play a relatively 
significant role among other factors. 
  Still in line with the “peer regard” hypothesis, and to also account for the observations 
of Raymond and others, we add the two following “social norms” that are taken to affect 
developers’ task-selection decisions:  
[a] Launching a new project is more rewarding than contributing to an existing one, all the 
more so when several contributions have already been made: namely, the first contributions to 
a given module are more rewarding than later ones – this is more or less analogous to the 
“first to publish” rule in open science communities, and it seems to be also relevant in open 
source ones. 
[b] Contributing to an active project is more rewarding that contributing to a stagnant or 
dormant one, as contributions will simply be more noticed by a larger number of peers, for it 
also is a relevant consideration for individuals seeking peer regard that one’s contributions, 
however technically astute, should have an audience. 
  Translating this more into mathematical terms, we have: 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) a module: mm m m m mr x r x ρα α ∀= + − , (0.2) 
where  () m ρ α  still stands for the expected
33 reward of contributing α to module m ,  ( ) m r •  is 
the cumulative reward function, i.e. the total reward associated with the sum of all 
contributions to module m ,  m x  is the current level of improvement of module m, i.e. 
                                                 
32 We are also close here to the more recent research on modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), and extending the 
model further in this direction, notably by studying more extensively, and modelling more accurately the actual 
technical interactions between modules, would also be a very fruitful research avenue. 
33 Part of the reward at least, especially for new modules, depends upon other contributions to be added later: 
therefore its expected nature.   - 18 -
precisely the sum of all past contributions, for instance measured in total number of added and 
deleted lines of code, and α is a potential contribution for a developer’s given effort 
endowment expressed according to the same measure. Clearly then, by construction, for m′ 
the virtual module associated withm : 
   ( ) :0 mm m mx r x ′ ′′ ′ ∀= =  (0.3) 
Thus: 
   ( ) ( )  the virtual module associated with module  : mm mm r ρ αα ′′ ′ ∀= , (0.4) 
where   () ' m r •  is a (positive) increasing concave function of the randomly drawn contribution, 
in conformity with rule [a] above, which imposes that the first contributions are more 
rewarded than the later ones. 
  We now specify, further, that: 
   () () () ( ) ( ) 1
mm mm d m d mm m rx r x v xd c
γ λ − == + , (0.5) 
where  m d  is the distance of module m from the first “root” module;  ( )
m dm vx  is the function 
which gives the version number of module m  at distance  m d  from the root from its current 
improvement  m x ;  m c  is the number of contributions received by module m , and  0 λ ≥  and 
0 γ ≥  are parameters. 
  This simplification of  () m r •  into  ( )
m d r •  is a direct consequence of the hierarchical and 
lexicographic assumptions in the reward system: the expected reward associated with 
contributing to module m depends on its location in the software architecture only to the 
degree of its vertical distance from the root of the code tree,  m d . This power of the attraction 
exerted by modules positioned closer to the role is governed by the magnitude of the 
characteristic exponent λ : when  0 λ =  all modules are similarly rewarded, whatever their 
height  m d , whereas, as λ  goes to infinity the rewards associated with contributing to modules 
closer to the root tend to be larger. Thus, we have:  
   ()() ( ) ( ) () 00 1  and  : 0 as  root root root m m r x v x c m root r x
γ
λ = +∀ ≠ → → + ∞  (0.6) 
Since the height of a virtual module is the height of its parent module plus one (by 
construction), equations (0.4) and (0.5) above imply: 
   () () () () ( ) 11 :1
mm mmd d m mr r v d
λ
ρα α α α
−
′′ ++ ∀= = = + , (0.7) 
and  
   () ( ) :1 1  s i n c e   : 0 mm mc m c
γ
′′ ∀+= ∀= . (0.8) 
By construction, the term in  m c  in equation (0.5) above allows us to account for rule [b], 
namely, to render the more active projects more rewarding for further contributions – even 
more and more so as γ  increases, whereas this effect disappears completely when  0 γ = . It is 
therefore not relevant for potential (virtual) modules, and the mathematical expression has 
been chosen in consequence of this. 
  We then define also:   - 19 -
   ( ) ( ) log 1
m dm m m vx x d
μ =+  ,  (0.9) 
where  0 μ ≥  is another characteristic exponent. Its sign implies that it is easier to increase 
version numbers for high modules than for lower ones. In all cases, one readily may verify 
that  ()
m dm vx , and therefore  () ' mm rx, are positive increasing concave functions of m x , which is 
in line which our assumption that early contributions get more reward at every level in the 
tree. 
  To complete the description of the model it is necessary to specify the distribution of 
momentary “contribution capabilities,” denoted by α. This can be viewed as arising from the 
convolution of two underlying distributions: the distribution of the time endowments of 
individual contributors, and the distribution of their individual code-writing efficiencies, 
measuring the latter by the amount of code (in physical lines of standard quality code 
produced per hour).
 34 What the present version of the model specifies is the “reduced form” 
distribution that governs the size of the contribution submitted at each moment in the 
iteration. On the basis of the data gathered by the FLOSS-US Survey regarding the 
distribution of hours per week that respondents reported having working on their current open 
source project, it appears that a left-skewed specification of the “endowment distribution” is 
appropriate in this context.
35 For computational convenience, we posit that the instantaneous 
contributions (α) follow an exponential distribution, whence, by using the classical inverse 
transformation method on the cumulative distribution (e.g. Ross, 2003), we can compute the 
following exponential random number generator, which generates contributions α from a 
uniformly distributed probability: 
         ()
1
ln 1 p α
δ
= −− ,         (0.10) 
where,  [ ] 0;1 p∈  is uniformly distributed and δ  controls the mean of the distribution: a 




= , where  .  denotes the variable’s mean. 
  Simulation experiments can then be run easily according to this model: at each 
discrete time step a new contribution is added to the existing system
36, i.e. either an existing 
module is improved or a new one is created. The simulation procedure is the following: 
  (a) A random contribution is given by eq. (0.10) ; 
                                                 
34 For the present version of the model no distinctions are made among contributions according to their purpose, 
i.e., whether they are “patches” submitted to correct bugs, or additions of new features – which Raymond 
(1998a) has characterized as “patches for bugs of omission”. We do not account either for the involvement of 
commercial developers: we have started doing experiments in this respect, which will be reported elsewhere. 
35 See David, Waterman and Arora, 2003: p. 36 (Fig.48) on the distribution of hours per week, for which the 
mode (6 hrs.) and the median (7 hrs.) lie close together, and the mean of the upper half of the distribution is 15.8 
hrs.; p. 38 (Fig. 49) shows that the distribution of maximum numbers of hours worked in a week on a single is 
far higher and more skewed: the mode being 31 hrs., and the median 39 hrs. On the supposition that individual 
productivity rates are correlated positively with time inputs (which cannot be said to be empirically established), 
the left-skew of the distribution of “endowments” –measured in equivalent lines of code—would be even more 
pronounced.  
36 As in all the experiments presented here, starting only with the root module with the initial improvement 
(number 1).   - 20 -
(b) The rewards of all existing modules, considering their current improvements, and of 
all virtual modules are computed according to eqs. (0.5), (0.7), and (0.9); 
  (c) A module is chosen according to eq. (0.1), and the system is then modified in  
 consequence. 
Figure 2 presents a typical result, in line with Figure 1, where each depicted tree is separated 
from its predecessor below by several time steps for the clarity of the exposition. Numbers are 
version numbers, which in the present version of the model do not account, although we have 
worked on more refined specifications of the model, the fact that in real software systems the 
change from version 1.9 to 2.0 is typically qualitatively different from the change from 
version 1.1 to 1.2, and more generally that software systems tend to conform to specific rules 
for numbering versions. 
 
(Insert Figure 2 About Here) 
   
  This framework can be used to analyse some of the properties of the emerging 
software systems, particularly the morphologies of emerging code trees and their sensitivity to 
parameter variations. In Section 5, we focus on a pair of parameters (λ, and γ) and interpret 
their varying configurations as corresponding to mixtures of the underlying developer 
population’s “motivations-at-the-margin.” That interpretation permits us to associate 
particular constellations of those motives with a corresponding set of morphological features 
of the code-tree – as generated by the corresponding probabilistic assignment function in eq. 
(0.1). And by the same token, it is possible to reverse the direction of inference: searching 
over the space of alternative combination of (λ, γ) permits calibration of the model so that it 
can simulate morphological features of the project’s output consistent with “empirical 
regularities” that are observed in the evolution large open source projects. In thus delimiting 
an empirically relevant domain of the parameter space, we will have delimited the relevant 
domain of the underlying motives that should be viewed as serving to allocate the sequential 
contributions made by those participating in the project.  
 
 
5. Simulating macro-level features of open source code evolution 
  By simulating the micro-level allocation dynamics it is possible to study their 
consequences for the emergent macro-properties the code that produced by a large open 
source project, considered in isolation. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask whether and what 
ranges of parameter values some macro-properties that have been observed to characterise 
actual projects of this kind can be reproduced by our simulation model. To the extent that 
there is a correspondence, we could reasonably view the latter as capable of being generated 
by the complex “stygmergic” mechanism that has been hypothesized, in which internal 
resource allocation is probabilistically guided by the evolving state of the code, because the 
latter elicits responses from developers who are “motivated-at-the-margin” by one or another 
of the several forms of expected “reward” that attach to contributing to various sites in the 
project.  
  We focus here on two such macro properties: linearity of growth and skewed-ness of 
the distribution of module sizes.
37 In exploring these questions, we focus attention on the 
                                                 
37 In future works, we intend to move toward more detailed analyses of the properties of code architectures.   - 21 -
influence of the two key parameters λ  andγ , which respectively characterize the strength of 
the kudos-seeking propensity, and the social interaction propensity of developer community 
members. These interpretations can be elaborated with the aid of Figure 3.  
  In support this interpretation, we note that the effect of higher values of the 
parameterλ  is to raise the relative reputational rewards, and hence the attractiveness of 
contributing to the lower-levels of the code tree. Thus, when considered in conjunction with 
the specifications of the norms on which “peer regard” is bestowed within the open source 
“hacker” community, λ  in effect controls the strength of the influence on task selection of the 
exercised by the “kudos-seeking motivation”. For present purposed, the latter embraces both 
the psychic, ego-gratification of Eric Raymond’s (1999) hackers “homesteading the 
Noosphere,” and the material success-oriented participants who Lerner and Tirole (2003) 
depict as publicly signalling their expertise in order create an external reputation – reflecting 
the peer regard of the hacker community – in the expectation of subsequently garnering 
economic payoffs. As different in character as those motives may be, operationally both 
would have the effect of focusing the agents’ contributions on modules that were closer to the 
root of the code-tree; and neither type would be particularly attracted to “follow the crowd,” 
i.e., to contribute to modules where much code already had been written. Accordingly, we 
have marked the upper left-hand corner of the parameter space in Figure 3 to be to home 
ground for contributions generated by “Raymondian” and “Lerner-Tirolean” micro-
motivations.  
 The  parameterγ , on the other hand, raises the relative attraction exerted by modules to 
which there have been many prior contributions, and where, because many individuals can be 
presumed to have been involved and acquired knowledge of that particular code structure and 
its development, there are greater apparent opportunities for social interactions and 
particularly for interactive learning and skills-improvement which (as was noted in Section 3) 
figures among the salient reasons that survey respondents cite for their continuing 
participation in open source development activities. Higher values of γ  may be interpreted as 
associated with the attraction of sites where there is greater scope to for developers to enter 
readily and enjoy the benefits more frequent interactions with others who are closer to their 
own stage of expertise. 
This points to the lower right-hand corner of the parameter plane in Figure 3 as the 
locus of the pure “social interaction and skill-seeking neophytes, because that is where the 
kudos-seeking attraction of working at the more technically important and/or complex 
modules closer to the root of the code-tree is weakest. It follows that upper right-hand corner 
of the λ - γ plane represents the locus of concentration of more expert seekers of kudos who 
derive physical rewards not only from peer approbation of their technical achievements, seek 
to establish a charismatic leadership role by working on sub-projects where others are 
engaged. For the sake of brevity we affix the label “social hacker” to this corner of Figure 3. 
It remains to note that where the motivation for peer regard is weak, and where individuals are 
induced to make contributions more by the prospects of producing specific software 
applications from whose use they anticipate enjoying a stream of benefits, we would expect to 
find the purest form of the “user-innovators” who figure prominently in the research of Eric 
von Hippel and his co-authors that addresses the phenomenon of open source software.
38 
                                                 
38 See Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel (2000), Lakhani and von Hippel (2003).   - 22 -
Obviously, then lower left-hand corner of the parameter space must the home base of “von 
Hippelites”.
39 
    (Insert Figure 3 About Here) 
 
  4.1 Simulation results on ‘linearity’ in code growth 
  The macro-level regularities observed in the evolution of computer software has 
formed a subject of interest among software engineers that extends back over some three 
decades to the pioneer studies by Lehman (1980, 2000), who adduced a number of empirical 
“laws” of software development. On the basis of observations from commercial development 
projects on the pace at which the number of files grew in the period following the initial 
release of product, Lehman’s “Fourth Law” revised by Turski (1996), held that the pace at 
which files were added was close to linear but tended to slow in absolutely as well as in 
proportion to the existing code base.
40 Among expectations that could be offered in support of 
this assertion, the argument could be that the number of possible interconnections among n 
files would increase approximately as the square of their number, and this would tend to 
absorb a rapidly rising amount of effort in writing and debugging, thereby slowing the pace at 
which further files could be added.
41 A further implication of this view was that those projects 
that were able to mobilize the additional resources to keep developing new code, would tend 
to produce an unmanageably complex and interconnected mass of files, and in the end would 
encounter overwhelming maintenance problems. 
   The issue of code evolution in large software projects recently has drawn renewed 
attention, stimulated by the emergence and continuing, readily visible growth of the code of 
widely known open source projects like Apache, Mozilla, GNOME, and Linux. There is now 
evidence that a super-linear growth profile characterizes the continuing evolution of some of 
                                                 
39 It should be stressed that this is the “pure form” of the species. In von Hippel (2004, 2005) the point is made 
that user-innovations often “freely reveal” details of their inventions (certainly so in the case of open source 
software), and this is explained by resort to a mixture of essentially instrumental utilitarian rationales, including 
reputation-building a la Lerner-Tirole (2003), and garnering interest and possibly external incremental 
applications of the new product. 
40 See the discussion of this literature in Scacchi (2003) and Robles et al. (2005); particularly the convex growth 
profiles – following an inverse square law – that are reported by the statistical analyses of proprietary 
commercial project by Turski (1996), and the recent reconsideration of the topic by Lehman (1997). The IMB 
360/OS exhibited a growth profile that was linear in the number of releases, which was a notable exception 
among the small number of commercial software systems that were examined in the early studies. 
41 This argument differs from the class “span of attention” problem that is likely to rise if control of 
commitments is hierarchically controlled with final authority residing in a single “maintainer,” a situation that 
appears to have been confronted, and overcome by the Linux kernel project, soon after the number of physical 
lines of code (in release 2.1) passed the 1 million mark. Larry McVoy, in an oft-cited email dated 30 September 
1998 (see McVoy et al. 1998) wrote:   
   “The Problem ---- 
   “The problem is that Linus doesn't scale. We can't expect to see the rate of change to the kernel, which 
gets more complex and larger daily, continue to increase and expect Linus to keep up. But we also don't want to 
have Linus lose control and final say over the kernel, he's demonstrated over and over that he is good at that.  
  “The basic solution ---- 
“Figure out a means by which Linus can surround himself with some number of people who do part of   his 
job. Add tools which make that possible.”  
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the sub-directories of the Linux kernel.
42 It has also been shown recently that conformity with 
a linear pattern in the temporal evolution of file size is quite general among many less 
exceptional but nonetheless substantial “open-source” software systems that are being 
developed in C-mode. Linearity in this context means constancy of the number of new files 
added in each interval of time. In Robles et al. (2005) are presented the results of a recent 
statistical study of the evolution of file sizes for 18 open-source projects: 15 of them exhibit a 
linear regression fit with R
2 values above 0.90; in the case of 10 projects the linear fit is even 
closer, leaving only 5 percent of the variance unexplained. We therefore take “linearity” as a 
first target at which to aim in setting empirically relevant parameters for our simulation 
model.  
  Figure 4 displays the results of searching the (λ, γ)–space to discover whether linear 
growth profiles emerge with various settings of these parameters. For each setting of those 
parameters (holding the other parameter values unchanged), ten simulations were run and the 
time path of the average count of the number of nodes, or modules in the graph describing the 
code tree, was obtained. Figure 4 summarizes the results by plotting the value of the 
correlation coefficient R
2 obtained by fitting a linear regression model to the averaged time 
series for each of the sets of parameter-settings employed.
43 What it makes evident is that our 
simulation model embodies structural features which enable it to generate the characteristic 
linearity of code evolution of open-source software projects with a wide range of values of λ  
and γ . Although by itself this does not allow us to tightly fix the domain of “empirically 
relevant parameter values” it is in another respect very reassuring to find that linearity can be 
achieved with a wide range of values for the couplet (λ , γ ): as we previously have pointed 
out, the latter can be interpreted as reflecting many different combinations of underlying 
motivation-types among the members of the developer community attached to the project.  
 
        (Insert Figure 4 about Here) 
 
 
  4.2 Simulation results on the distribution of module sizes  
  A way to further characterize the morphology of the code is to compute the Gini 
coefficient of the distributions of the sizes of modules – the tree’s “leaves”. The reason for 
this is an interesting empirical finding about the distribution of the sizes of the modules within 
large projects. Ghosh & David (2003), in their study of the development of the Linux kernel, 
                                                 
42 See the extensive analysis by Godfrey and Tu (2000), which also surveys the background of previous findings 
regarding commercial software evolution, against which the case of Linux stands out as particularly anomalous, 
and also later results by Robles et al. (2005). 














Similar results seem to hold generally for other values, and we focus here on showing the emergence of macro-
properties as a robust feature of the basic structural specifications of the model, depending upon the foregoing 
plausible fixed values, and exploring the effects of variations in λ , and γ  .   - 24 -
reproduced here as Table 1, show that the distribution of module sizes is very skewed, with 10 
percent of the modules accounting from more than half of the projects total code (measured in 
bytes). Moreover, the Gini coefficients of the distribution of module sizes tend are not only 
high from an early stage of the project’s development (Release 1.0.3), but they continue to 
rise. Although these results were obtained for a rather exceptional project (however 
emblematic the Linux kernel may be), they appear to characterize other large open-source 
projects, such as GNOME. This relatively striking feature means that there is a limited 
number of modules with receive numerous contributions, and a large number of modules with 
only a limited number of contributions. 
  Figure 5 presents the Gini coefficients measuring the degree of concentration of the 
module-size distribution obtained from simulations which hold constant all the parameter 
except the pairs (λ ,γ ), varying the latter over the whole of the potentially relevant domain. 
Clearly, the region of the parameter-space within which these parameter-couplets (which we 
interpreted as reflecting the strength of “kudos-seeking” and “social interaction and skill-
seeking” motives, respectively) powerfully raises the degree of concentration in the 
distribution of the project’s code. There is a fairly narrow the region in which the Gini 
coefficients exceed 0.7, and this surrounds the “ridge-line” that appears in Figure 5.
44 Notice 
that the simulation experiments reveals the existence of a linear combination of λ  and γ  that 
defines a “project viability” limit; above this boundary, the software system fails to develop 
and leaves essentially all the code growth confined to a single (root) module.
45 Furthermore, 
these results tend to suggest that the evolution Linux, as reported in Table 1 above, would 
correspond to values of γ  close to or greater than 1, i.e. to developers’ task selections being 
guided by rather strong propensities for social interaction and skill-improvement.  
 
        (Insert Table 2 About Here) 
 
  To these results may be added several others, from simulation exercises that are not 
displayed here:  
i.  High Gini coefficients do not emerge when growing software systems without rule 
[b] above, i.e. if we set γ = 0, so that modules do not attract further contributions 
on the basis of the number of contributions they previously received (as indicated 
by their version number);  
ii.  High Gini coefficients do not emerge when rule [b] is replaced by an alternative 
specification that allow the accumulation of many offshoots from a given module 
to reduce that module’s attractiveness as a site for further contributions;  
iii.  Gini coefficients tend to increase with time as the size of the code grows, but again 
conditional on the value of γ  being sufficiently big, a finding that is not 
inconsistent with the preliminary evidence presented by Table 1 for the case of the 
Linux kernel.  
  
  4.3 The calibrated model and its implications about micro-motivations 
                                                 
44 Along that line are found maximum concentration measures for G in the range 0.86-.88. 
45 A close approximation to this boundary line is found as: max-Gini = (0.1)λ  + (0.43)γ .   - 25 -
  The foregoing results from simulation of the macro-properties large open-source 
projects carry implications about the empirically relevant domain of the parameter space in 
our model. First we can project onto the (λ,γ)-plane of Figure 3 the empirically relevant broad 
parameter domain in which code evolution exhibits linear time trends for the count of 
modules in the project. The result appears in the transparent darker area on the left and upper 
side of the plane in Figure 6, bounded by an arc that descends from the top right corner. Next 
we project the domain of relevantly high Gini coefficients – corresponding roughly to the 
region of Gini-values upwards of 0.7 – onto the same plane. This forms the dotted-blue band, 
sloping downwards from left to right in the middle of the (λ,γ)-plane depicted in Figure 6. 
The zone in which the two projects intersect forms the tilted lozenge, marked with a wiggly 
green line in the figure. This overlay on the space indicating the micro-motive interpretations 
of the parameter values (displayed in Figure 3) points to a number of implications about the 
micro-motives of the contributors to our simulated open source software project. 
  The results reinforce the central message emerging from the (previously cited) survey 
inquiries into the motives that impel developers to contribute to a particular open source 
community’s project. It not appropriate to think of the communities mobilized by the large 
projects as monolithic, or even as reflecting a single salient motive which can be said to typify 
their participants. The implication that mixtures of motives must characterize these 
communities is plausible and reassuring. There are good empirical grounds for thinking that 
“core developers” are at work on these projects, and it is reasonable to characterize them in 
the way that Raymond (1999) does as being concerned primarily with the esteem in which 
they are held by expert peers in the hacker community. Whether this matters for instrumental, 
career-related reasons, including the prospective material rewards that Lerner and Tirole 
(2002) see as inducing them to volunteer, or whether the spur is the personal ego-gratification 
of gaining “peer regard,” is not really consequential in this connection. Similarly, one must 
acknowledge that large projects also mobilize a periphery of the “less expert” participants 
who are attracted to contribute to sub-projects that promise to enhance their skills in 
programming, or satisfy their desire for an involvement in social interactions directed to a 
practical collective purpose. The results of the calibrating the model point militate against 
accepting either or both of those “pure types” as characterising the motivational drivers of the 
members of FLOSS development communities. Correspondingly, there is rather more room in 
the picture for both “social hackers,” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, individualists 
who are drawn to work on specific applications that would provide tools that meets their 
immediate and idiosyncratic needs. 
 
5. Conclusions, Qualifications and the Way Forward 
   The intermediate positioning of the empirically relevant domain – within the plane of 
the parameter-pair identified in Figure 6 – may be interpreted legitimately as telling us that 
the populations of developers forming the “intelligent swarms” at work on code of the larger 
FLOSS projects comprise various “mixtures” of individual actors who may be loosely 
categorized as having distinctive motivational profiles.  It is therefore not surprising to notice 
that this view is entirely consistent with the impression obtained from Table 1, which showed 
the distribution of FLOSS-US survey respondents working in larger project communities 
among the motivational profiles extracted by cluster analysis.  Although some of the labels we 
have affixed to those empirical clusters coincide with the “pure type” characterizations at the 
corners of the parameter-plane in Figures 3 and 6, it is not possible to draw any strict 
correspondence between the parameter domain and the empirical weights of the motivational  
clusters in Table 1, because in this reduced form models the individual agents are not   - 26 -
distinguished from one another by their susceptibilities to “rewards” for contributions of 
different kinds, made at different places in the evolving code map of the project.     
  This paper has described the rationale and results of the most recently completed stage 
in the construction of a stochastic model that can simulate the process of open source software 
development in “community-mode”. A quite lengthy list of questions of analytical interest – 
questions that clearly could be pursued by elaborating the model in various ways, already has 
been compiled in the previously published reports on this undertaking.
46 It appears now that 
there are three main directions in which the next phase of the project could most usefully 
proceed. One path would continue towards elaborating the present framework of the model to 
permit more precise calibration and simulation of a greater number of aspects of the evolving 
code of a single large project. This would increase the relevance of this modelling tool by 
taking into consideration a greater number of empirical regularities in regard to the types and 
sizes of modules, the structure of technical dependences among modules, the overall 
architectural morphology of the code, and so forth.  An alterative branch on the same 
empirical path would take the model towards accommodating greater micro-level detail its 
representations of the behaviors of the individual project participants. By identifying the 
simulated agents, and tracking the history of their contributions, and perhaps the latter’s 
relationships to technical features of the code, it would be possible also to address other 
questions, such as the sources of the highly skewed distributions of contributions to the code 
of these community-based projects.  There is yet another obvious and important path to follow 
in the next phase of model-building: taking a discrete step from simulating the generation of 
an isolated code-tree to the simulation of a forest of such trees. 
   Looking ahead on the several indicated trajectories for future elaboration of the 
model, it seems obvious that it will be beyond our power to adequately pursue on our own 
even the principal items in the vast research agenda that is opening before us. At least, it will 
not be possible to go forward at a pace that can keep up with the proliferating sources of 
empirical data that a fully specified model could illuminate, or with the multiplying policy 
questions that a carefully parameterized model could be used to analyze. Consequently, in a 
somewhat self-referential fashion, we are moving towards facilitating the conduct of the 
simulation project in the distributed open-source manner. The multi-tree release of the model 
will provide the source code we have used in exercising the model so that others may use to 
replicate our results and further modify and elaborate the structure. Whether this should 
formally become an experiment in organizing this kind of research on open-source as an 
open-source-like project – with all that this implies about claims to copyrights, licensing 
terms and governance norms – raises some interesting and arresting questions that at this 
point have not been resolved.  Collaboration is far from costless, and the resources and 
ingenuity that FLOSS projects must devote to managing their growth are more likely to find 
the appreciative recognition and representation that they undoubtedly deserve within this 
modelling framework if the open-source and “open science” modes can indeed be fused in the   
reformulation of SimCode as a platform on which others can build.  
                                                 
46  See Dalle and David (2003/2005, 2006); Dalle, David, den Besten and Lacage (2006).   - 27 -
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Figure 4: 
Parameter Values Generating Linearity of Code Growth 
Explanation: “R-square” is the mean value of the goodness of fit of a linear time-trend to the 





Gini coefficient for module size distribution 











The location of the “empirically relevant zone” of the λ-γ parameter space  
 
Explanation: The darkly shaded zone of the parameter-space (which generates linear growth in the 
number of project modules and high concentration in the distribution module code-size) is also the 
region away from all the corners: mixtures of all four “pure” motivation-types are necessary to 
characterize the expected responses of the ensemble of agents contributing code to the project.     - 5 -
Table 1: Distribution of Developers by “Motivation Profiles” Identified by 
Cluster Analysis of Sub-samples of the FLOSS-US Survey Respondents 
– Grouped  by the known membership size of their current project 
 










Non- ideological, expert, self-employed or company-










Don’t need to modify existing code, but like to fix bugs, 









Seek to become better programmers, find out how 
programs work; work with like-minded, ‘give back to 









Need to modify existing code and fix bugs, see open 









Modifying existing software is not important, nor are 
learning and interacting with like-minded others; want to 
‘give back to community’, likely to have launched own 











Source: Underlying data from David and Shapiro (2007: Tables 6, 7, 13)  I-Mode stands for “Independent 
Mode” (participant’s known projects have 1 or 2 members) and C-Mode stands for “Community-Mode” 
(participant’s known projects have 30 members or more).  Figures 3 and 6, and the accompanying text of the 
present paper playfully associate the combination of  characteristics among the “professionals” and “hackers” 
(above) with “Raymondian Lerner-Tiroleans”(with apologies to Jean Tirole); and affix the label “von 
Hippelites” to the “individualistic user-innovators” (with apologies to Eric von Hippel).  
 
Table 2: Module size distribution statistics for selected releases of the Linux kernel 






Total bytes of code (millions)  4.5  21.0  133.8 
Total physical lines of code (millions)  0.122  0.538  3.158 
Modules (packages)  30  60  169 
% of bytes in top 10% of modules   33.0  57.0  70.0 
% bytes in top 20% of modules  51.0  74.0  79.0 
Gini coefficient  0.54  0.68  0.72 
 
Source: Ghosh and David (2003), Tables 1 and 6. 
 